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Aboriginal Sovereignty and Imperial Claims
Abstract
It is commonly assumed that indigenous American nations had neither sovereignty in international law nor
title to their territories when Europeans first arrived; North America was legally vacant and European powers
could gain title to it simply by discovery, symbolic acts, occupation, or treaties among themselves. It follows,
on this view, that current indigenous claims to internal sovereignty or a "third order of government" have no
historical basis. This paper argues that this viewpoint is misguided and cannot be justified either by reference
to positive international law or basic principles of justice. The author's view is that indigenous American
nations had exclusive title to their territories at the time of European contact and participated actively in the
formation of Canada and the United States. This fact requires us to rewrite our constitutional histories and
reconsider the current status of indigenous American nations.




It is commonly assumed that indigenous American nations had neither
sovereignty in international law nor title to their territories when
Europeans first arrived; North America was legally vacant and European
powers could gain title to it simply by discovery, symbolic acts,
occupation, or treaties among themselves. It follows, on this view, that
current indigenous claims to internal sovereignty or a "third order of
government" have no historical basis. This paper argues that this
viewpoint is misguided and cannot be justified either by reference to
positive international law or basic principles of justice. The author's view
is that indigenous American nations had exclusive title to their territories
at the time of European contact and participated actively in the formation
of Canada and the United States. This fact requires us to rewrite our
constitutional histories and reconsider the current status of indigenous
American nations.
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I INTRODUCTION
The international legal history of North America has
traditionally been presented as a series of military and diplomatic
struggl s among European states and their colonial offshoots,
culminating in the grand treaty settlements of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries in which the modern international boundaries
of the United States and Canada were fixed.1 The accounts differ
in explaining exactly how the European powers originally gained
sovereignty over North America, with some authors allowing for
such supposed methods as discovery and symbolic acts, and others
discounting these and arguing that effective occupation was
necessary.2  Despite these differences, the traditional accounts tend
to assume that the original peoples of North America had no
significant role to play in this high imperial drama. Indigenous
peoples, it is thought, lacked sovereign status in law and so had no
international title to the territories they occupied. On this view, the
lands of North America were legally equivalent to vacant territories
which could be appropriated by the first European state to discover
or occupy them. The only role assigned to the original inhabitants
of North America was subsidiary, as factual obstacles or aids to the
spread of European sovereignty.
This approach is by. no means dead. In a recent study of
European claims to territory in America, LC. Green concludes with
this flat statement:
Insofar as international law is concerned, there can be no doubt that the title to the
land belonged, in the first instance, to the country of those who first discovered and
settled thereon ... Moreover, international law did not recognise the aboriginal
inhabitants of such newly discovered territories as having any legal rights that were
good as against those who "discovered" and settled in their territories. From the
1 See, ag, the monumental work by M. Savelle, The Origins of American Diplomacy: The
International History of Angloameric, 1492-1763 (New York: Macmillan, 1967).
2 For a variety of views, see, eg., A.S. Keller, J. Lissitzyn & FJ. Mann, Creation of Rights
of Sovereignty through Symbolic Acts, 1400-1800 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1938);
F.A-F. von der Heydte, "Discovery, Symbolic Annexation and Virtual Effectiveness in
International Law" (1935) 29 Am. J. Int'l Law 448; 3. Goebel, The Struggle for the Falkland
Islands (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1927); and LC. Green, "Claims to Territory in
Colonial America" in L.C. Green & O.P. Dickason, eds, The Law of Nations and the New
World (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1989) 1.
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point of view of international law, such inhabitants became the subjects of the ruler
exercising sovereignty over the territory. As such, they enjoyed no rights that
international law would recognize, nor was international law concerned with the
rights which they might enjoy or which they might claim under the national law of
their ruler.f
These remarkable views, although prominent in histories of
international law and diplomacy, are not restricted to that narrow
genre. They permeate narratives of all kinds, from popular historical
romances, through movies and television dramas, to newspaper
editorials and legal decisions. Even when not explicitly stated, they
show their influence in the structure of the story-line, the
importance assigned to various episodes, and the terminology
employed. Thus, such events as the fall of Quebec and the Treaty
of Paris of 1763 are assigned a central place in the history of North
America, while the peace treaties with the various native American
nations in the same era receive only scant attention outside of
specialist literature. The great Aboriginal-British war that engulfed
the eastern and mid-western regions of North America in the period
1763-64 is dubbed "Pontiac's Rebellion," on the assumption that
native Americans were rebelling against legitimate British rule rather
than asserting their rights against invading forces.
The Eurocentric premises of traditional accounts have come
under heavy attack in recent decades. The heightened political
activism of Aboriginal groups, the large numbers of native claims
reaching the courts, and the revival of interest in native American
history have all contributed to the development of more critical
attitudes to the European penetration of the continent. This
development is welcome and long overdue. Yet, while there is a
growing consensus among historians and lawyers that the old legal
framework is flawed, there is uncertainty and confusion as to how
the situation may be remedied.
A historian, dismayed at the distortions caused by the old
legal premises and daunted by the prospect of having to supply new
ones, might well decide to avoid making any legal assumptions
whatever and concentrate on the factual interplay of people and
forces. By contrast, a lawyer or judge, bewildered at the complex
historical panorama disclosed by the new scholarship, might think
3 Green, ibid. at 125-26.
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that the only safe route lies in a legal analysis that steers clear of
historical materials. If only, says the historian, there were no law
to distort our understanding of the historical forces; if only, says the
lawyer, there were no history to muddy the purity of the law.
But history and law are not so easily severed. From early
times, Aboriginal-European relations were profoundly shaped by
legal conceptions on both sides, to the extent that they can hardly
be understood otherwise. For example, the numerous treaties
concluded between First Nations and colonial governments played an
essential role in determining the various parties' expectations and
actions and in moulding their understanding (and misunderstanding)
of the other parties. These treaties necessarily figure prominently
in any historical account of Aboriginal-European relations.
Moreover, they are central to the self-understanding of many native
American groups today and are an important basis for contemporary
legal claims. It would be difficult to give an account of the treaties
that is sensible and informative and yet avoids dealing with the basic
issues of their legal status, character, and effects.
Here we encounter fundamental problems. What sort of
legal authorities are relevant to an understanding of a treaty
between Europeans and native Americans? This depends on our
initial characterization of the pact. Is it equivalent to an
international treaty between equal and sovereign entities? Or is it
some other sort of international or quasi-international agreement,
such as might arise between a sovereign nation and a dependent or
protected nation? Is it, perhaps, not an international instrument at
all, but a constitutional pact between a state and a body of its
subjects, or even a species of domestic contract? More radically, is
it perhaps not a true agreement in any sense, but a unilateral state
act imposing terms on a group of subjects, closer in character to a
statute?
These questions raise the issue of the relative status of the
European and native American parties at the time of the treaty.
Were they both sovereign international entities, or was one party
subject to the other, or a protected entity? How do we go about
answering this question? Is it sufficient to invoke standard
European authorities on international law, or must we also consult
non-European sources, including Aboriginal law and custom?
[VOL 29 No. 4
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Should we perhaps look beyond these sources to fundamental
principles of justice or "natural law"?
The question of native sovereignty is not, of course, simply
historical or academic. As the recent armed confrontations at
Kanesatake and Kahnawake vividly illustrate, issues of sovereignty
are implicated in many current disputes between native Americans
and governmental authorities over such matters as land claims, treaty
rights, the application of customary law, and powers of self-
government. Follow these disputes to their roots and you will often
encounter the unresolved issue of indigenous sovereignty. Until
some understanding on this matter is reached, it seems unlikely that
the disputes will be resolved or fade away.
Nevertheless, the task of providing a legal framework for
understanding the historical relations between Aboriginal peoples
and incoming settler groups is remarkably difficult. My aim in this
paper is to make a start. I will examine a number of standard
approaches to the subject and show that for various reasons they
are flawed or inadequate. I will then suggest approaches that hold
out more promise.
II. FRAMING THE QUESTION
Let us begin by considering the traditional model of
American international history This model involves a number of
premises which are grounded in a particular understanding of
international law. The most fundamental of these holds that North
America was juridically a vacant territory at the period of European
exploration and settlement - in technical language, terra nuius -
territory not belonging to any recognized international entity. On
this view, European states were capable of directly appropriating
American lands, securing what is known as an original title, that is,
a title not derived from any other state or legal entity. The
authorities disagree as to how an original title could be obtained.
4 The best general account of the issues is still M.F. Lindley, The Acquisition and
Gover=ment of Backward Territory in International Law, Being a Treatise on the Law and
Practice Relating to Colonial Expansion, 1926 ed. (New York- Negro University Press, 1969).
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Some argue that the first European state to "discover" or explore
American lands gained title. Others say that a symbolic act of
taking possession, such as the planting of a cross, a flag, or royal
insignia, was necessary. Still others insist that none of these
methods was valid, that the incoming European power had to
occupy the territories in an effective manner before sovereignty
vested, as by establishing settlements, a governmental apparatus, or
at least the elements of factual control.
All these methods - discovery, symbolic acts, and effective
occupation - presuppose that North America was legally vacant at
the relevant time, that there were no existing rights capable of
impeding the smooth flow of incoming sovereignty. In classic
European thought, methods such as discovery, symbolic acts, or
effective occupation cannot operate in territories that are already
under the sovereignty of another power, no matter how small the
territory or weak the incumbent power.5 No one, for example,
would seriously suggest that a visiting British official could gain title
to Vatican City for the Queen simply by raising the Union Jack in
St. Peter's Square. Where a territory is already held by a sovereign
power, title to it can be won only by such methods as conquest,
cession from the existing sovereign, or the continuous exercise of
factual dominion for a period long enough to confer prescriptive
title.6
The premise that America was legally vacant at the time of
European contact has several corollaries. The first, as we have seen,
holds that native American peoples did not have sovereignty over
5 As Grotius remarked with respect to Portuguese claims to the East Indies, "[D]iscovery
per se gives no legal rights over things unless before the alleged discovery they were res nullius.
Now these Indians of the East, on the arrival of the Portuguese, although some of them were
idolators, and some Mohammedans, and therefore sunk in grievous sin, had nonetheless
perfect public and private ownership of their goods and possessions, from which they could
not be dispossessed without just cause." H. Grotius, Mare Liberum (The Freedom of the Seas),
ed. by J. B. Scott, trans. R. Van Deman Magoffin, 1608 ed. (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1916) at 13.
6 See, generally, Lindley, supra, note 4 at c. I-V; I. Brownlie, Principles of Public
International Law, 4th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) c. VII; and D.P. O'Connell,
International Law, vol. 1, 2d ed. (London: Stevens & Sons, 1970) c. XV. There are
considerable differences in terminology and classification among the authorities. I follow here
a simplified version of the classic terminology developed by European doctrinal writers in the
sixteenth to nineteenth centuries.
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the territories they occupied or controlled. If they did, their lands
would not be open to acquisition by discovery, symbolic acts, or
occupation.
The second corollary goes further. It holds that native
American peoples did not have any sort of lesser international title,
short of sovereignty, sufficient to exclude others from their
territories. This proposition meets the argument that, even if native
groups did not have full sovereignty (such as states might hold), they
did have sufficient territorial rights to prevent a legal vacuum from
existing. It could, for example, be maintained that although a small
band of Aboriginal hunters and fishers did not constitute a state, it
nevertheless formed an independent political entity holding exclusive
title to the territories it occupied. Were this the case, the lands in
question would not be terra nuius.
The third corollary maintains that where the title of a
European state to North American territories was not gained by an
original appropriation it arose by succession to the title of another
European state, by virtue of conquest, cession, or prescription.7 A
title gained in any of the latter ways is termed a derivative title
because it stems from some previous titleholder. The standard
model of legal title assumes that derivative titles could not be
secured from the native peoples, but only from other European
powers.
Large parts of North America are commonly thought to be
held under European-derived titles. According to traditional
accounts, Acadia was transferred by cession from France to Great
Britain in the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 and the remainder of French
Canada was conquered in 1759-60 and ceded to Britain by the
Treaty of Paris of 1763. Twenty years later, the Treaty of Paris of
1783 drew the boundary between the newly independent United
States and British territories to the North, recognizing the transfer
of sovereignty that occurred during the American Revolution. This
treaty was later supplemented by others, extending the international
boundary between the United States and British North America
westward to the Pacific. Native American peoples were not parties
7 For economy's sake, I will use "European states" to designate not only the imperial
powers proper, but also their colonial offshoots in North America.
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to any of these transactions, and under the traditional model, they
played no legal role in the process.
To hold that a European state obtained title to a certain
part of North America by succession to another European state
presupposes that the previous state (or some more remote
predecessor) held an original title that it could pass on to others.
If Britain obtained New France by cession from the French Crown
in 1763, France itself must have held a good title to the territory,
otherwise it would not have been capable of ceding it to Britain, any
more than a Parisian hustler can sell you the Eiffel Tower.8 On this
hypothesis, France's title was either original or derivative. The usual
view is that France obtained an original title to New France by
virtue of the explorations of Jacques Cartier and the settlements
initiated by Champlain.
Such is the standard scheme. The whole structure depends
on the premise that North America at the time of European
encounter was legally a vacant land available for appropriation,
despite the obvious fact that it was occupied and controlled by
native peoples. The critical question is whether this basic premise
is justified.
On purely historical grounds, it seems very doubtful that
European imperial powers consistently regarded Aboriginal America
as vacant territory. Any balanced survey of European state practice
reveals that although most imperial powers indulged on occasion in
lofty claims based on discovery, symbolic acts, and occupation, these
same powers often poured scorn on such claims when advanced by
their European rivals. In short, they were not prepared to grant
others the benefit of principles claimed on their own behalf. So, it
may be doubted whether the supposed rules achieved true reciprocal
8 Nemo dat quod non habet; one cannot give to another what one does not possess
oneself. As was stated in the Island of Palmas Case (1928), 2 U.N.R.I.A.A. 829 at 842, 'qhe
title alleged by the United States of America ... is that of cession, brought about by the Treaty
of Paris, which cession transferred all rights of sovereignty which Spain may have possessed
in the region ... It is evident that Spain could not transfer more rights than she herself
possessed" (emphasis in original).
[VOL 29 No. 4
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acceptance, even among the nations that stood to benefit from
them.9
Even if we assume that inter-European state practice was
sufficiently uniform to support a doctrine of discovery, there is a
wealth of historical evidence that some imperial powers, notably
Great Britain and France, followed quite different practices in their
direct dealings with native American peoples.10 In effect, there
were divergent streams of state practice, one inter-European, the
other European-Aboriginal. One way of reconciling these
differences is to say that the inter-European practice gave rise to a
local rule which bound European states among themselves and, yet,
had no effect on native American peoples, whose territorial rights
were unimpaired.11
However, let us waive these objections and suppose that
Spain, Portugal, Great Britain, France, and other European colonial
powers consistently treated Aboriginal America as legally vacant
territory and advanced claims to various parts of the continent on
9 The matter is considered in more detail in B. Slattery, The Land Rights of Indigenous
Canadian Peoples (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1979) at
66-125 [hereinafter Land Rights] and "Did France Claim Canada Upon 'Discovery'?" in J.M.
Bumsted, ed., Interpreting Canada's Past, vol. 1 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1986) 1
at 2-26, an earlier version of which appeared in (1978) 59 Can. Hist. Rev. 139. For other
discussions, see Goebel, supra, note 2 at 47-119; Lindley, supra, note 4; M.S. McDougal, H.D.
Lasswell & IA. Vlasic, Law and Public Order in Space (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1963) at 830-44; and von der Heydte, supra, note 2 at 452.
10 See, eg., J.D. Hurley, Children or Brethren: Aboriginal Rights in Colonial Iroquoia
(Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1985); P.C. Williams, The Chain
(LL.M. Dissertation, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 1982); and Land Rights, ibid
at 95-125.
11 A famous version of this view was espoused by Chief Justice Marshall of the United
States Supreme Court in Johnson v. M'Intosh, 5 LEd 681, 8 Wheat. 543 (1823) and
Worcester v. Georgia, 8 Law Ed 483, 6 Pet. 515 (1832) [hereinafter Worcester cited to Law Ed].
In Worcester at 544, Marshall said of the principle of discovery.
It was an exclusive principle which shut out the right of competition
among those who had agreed to it; not one which could annul the
previous rights of those who had not agreed to it. It regulated the right
given by discovery among the European discoverers, but could not affect
the rights of those already in possession, either as aboriginal occupants,
or as occupants by virtue of a discovery made before the memory of man.
See also O'Connell, supra, note 6 at 408-9. For a critical discussion of the Marshall view,
see B. Slattery, Ancestral Land4s Alien Laws: Judicial Perspectives on Aboriginal Thle
(Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1983) at 17-38.
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the basis of discovery, symbolic acts, or occupation. How can we
determine whether such claims were well-founded?
In asking this question, we move into the realm of normative
validity. Claims to title can of course be either valid or invalid. I
can consistently claim ownership over the red Corvette in the
window of my local car dealer, but if that claim is to be anything
more than wishful thinking, I have to show that it can be justified
in some manner. Were the grandiose claims to North America
advanced by such states as Britain and France in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries just wishful thinking? By what standards
can they be appraised?
According to the standard scheme, there are basically two
ways of answering this question. The first looks to some existing
body of "positive" or "conventional" law laid down by authority or
accepted by the people in question, such as the domestic law of the
claimant European state, the law of the Aboriginal nation whose
lands are at stake, or rules of positive international law. The second
approach detaches itself from any single system of positive law and
attempts to find some universal or transcendent basis for assessing
the matter, such as basic human values, inherent human rights, or
fundamental principles of justice. This is sometimes called a "natural
law" approach. Of course, the two approaches can be combined in
various ways. You might, for example, rely primarily on positive law
but resort to basic principles of justice as an ultimate test of validity.
Or you might use principles of justice in the very process of
determining what the positive rules are. For purposes of clarity,
however, these two approaches will initially be considered separately.
My basic argument is that any approach which purports to
rely exclusively on a body of positive or conventional law is
necessarily afflicted by arbitrariness or circularity. The only possible
approach is one that draws to some extent on basic principles of
justice. In fact, so-called "positive law" cannot be severed from
Itnatural law," nor the latter from the former: they are both aspects
of the unitary phenomenon of law. I will argue that native
American peoples held sovereign status and title to the territories
they occupied at the time of European contact and that this
fundamental fact transforms our understanding of everything that
followed. Finally, I will suggest that the best framework for
understanding relations between Aboriginal nations on the one hand
690 [VOL 29 No. 4
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and Canada and the United States on the other is provided by a
distinctive body of inter-societal law that was generated in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by interaction between native
peoples and settler governments.
III. POSITIVE LAW
A. The Legal System of a Claimant Nation
It could be argued that claims to sovereignty over North
American territories, whether advanced by European or Aboriginal
nations, should be judged according to criteria supplied by the
internal legal system of the claimant nation. If the claim meets
those criteria, then it is valid; if it fails to meet them, it is invalid.
There is an obvious difficulty with this approach, which has
not prevented it from being surprisingly popular in practice. Where
there are competing claims by different nations to the same territory
(a common occurrence in North American history), this approach
allows for each claim to be valid under the claimant's own laws.
But since the claims are exclusive of each other, they cannot both
be valid; one or the other (or both) must fail. For example, during
the period 1713-63, France, Great Britain, and Aboriginal nations
had overlapping claims to the territories now located in New
Brunswick and Nova Scotia. If we were to examine the particular
claim of each competing nation, we might well find that it satisfied
the requirements of that nation's domestic legal system and so would
be "valid" under that system. How should we go about resolving the
resulting conflict?
If the standards of one domestic legal system are chosen
over those of another without explanation, the solution is arbitrary.
If reasons are supplied, they must be founded on principles that
transcend the competing domestic systems involved, for to draw
reasons from just one system or another is both circular and
arbitrary. The question of which system of law should govern
cannot be resolved by reference to principles secreted by one of the
competing systems without assuming the supremacy of that system,
which is the very question to be resolved. Where reasons going
beyond the principles of a single system are sought or given, the
1991)
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approach necessarily takes on a different character, one that looks
to international law or basic principles of justice. These possibilities
will be discussed below.
The attitude of British courts to the question of territorial
claims advanced by the Crown resembles the approach considered
above! 2 These courts have generally held that where the Crown
has officially advanced an unequivocal claim of sovereignty over a
certain territory, British courts should recognize and enforce that
claim without further scrutiny, regardless of the degree of control
actually exerted by the government, the legal pedigree of the claim,
or the presence of competing claims by other states and peoples.
This is considered part of the "act of state" doctrine.
The reasons generally given for this doctrine are prudential:
it would be undesirable for the courts to review the acts of the
executive in matters relating to the acquisition and loss of territory.
On this view, these are high matters of state that should remain
within the exclusive purview of the government; the executive must
have the freedom to conduct foreign policy without fear of second-
guessing by the judicial branch, which is ill-equipped to make
decisions in these areas.
Whatever the merits of this argument in other contexts, it is
doubtful whether it should induce modern Canadian or American
courts to accept fictitious accounts of the manner in which their
countries came into being, accounts that accept even the most
extravagant imperial claims at face value and ignore the historical
presence and viewpoints of indigenous peoples. When it comes to
reconstructing the legal history of their own countries, courts cannot
take refuge in the act of state doctrine without forfeiting their moral
authority and acting as passive instruments of colonial rule. In this
context, the act of state doctrine is mischievous and should be
modified.
12 The point is considered in Land Rights, supra, note 9 at 63-65 and K. McNeil,
Common Law Aboriginal TIe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) at 110-12.
[VOL. 29 No. 4
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B. International Law
One possible way out of these difficulties is to look to
international law for criteria capable of resolving the competing
claims of European and Aboriginal nations. International law is in
concept a body of rules governing relations among states and
state-like entities, which among other things purports to determine
the basis of sovereign title to territory. In principle, international
law escapes from the objections against domestic legal systems
advanced above.
Nevertheless, international law has its own problems. In the
absence of a universal legislature, international rules are either a
matter of convention, based on agreement or customary practice,
or they flow in whole or in part from basic principles of justice.
To the extent that they stem from basic principles of justice, they
transcend positive international law and will be considered below.
Here, I will treat international law as a body of exclusively
conventional rules drawn from practice and agreement (henceforth
described simply as "practice" for convenience).
At this point, a serious methodological problem arises.
Assuming that practice is the basis for international norms, how does
one ascertain which entities belong to the group whose practice
generates the relevant norms? Remember that the question at stake
is whether or not native American polities were ever sovereign
entities. If the answer is affirmative, their practice must presumably
be considered in determining the character of the international
norms governing the acquisition of American territories. If the
answer is negative, then their practice is arguably irrelevant.
The problem is this: it is logically impossible to determine
the qualifications for membership in the international community by
examining the practice of the members of that community. To
proceed in this way assumes that one can identify in advance the
members whose practice is relevant. But these entities can be
identified only if one already knows the rules governing membership
in the community - which is, of course, the very issue to be
resolved.
An example may clarify the point. Suppose that around the
year 1600 the world was made up of a large variety of factually
1991]
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independent political entities, varying greatly in population, territory,
wealth, military power, political and social organization, culture,
religion, learning, and technology.13  A group of these polities,
composed of A, B, C, D, and E, in practice treat one another as
sovereign and equal and recognize one another as members of an
international community bound by certain rules. I will call this
group the Arcadians. They regard the remaining political entities of
the world, F through to Z, as failing to qualify for membership
because of perceived deficiencies in religion, culture, and civilization.
Polities F to Z, for their part, are not a homogeneous group. Polity
F, for example, an ancient and powerful empire in an area remote
from the Arcadians, considers itself the sole state worthy of the
name and regards all other political entities as inferiors, to be dealt
with, if at all, as tributary or subordinate powers. Its relations with
the Arcadians are infrequent. Polity CT, an empire in closer
proximity to the Arcadians, has more varied attitudes to outside
powers and is willing to deal with some on a basis of equality. But
it usually insists on treating the Arcadians as inferiors, viewing them
as infidels and barbarians. The remaining polities, H to Z, exhibit
varying attitudes to outside powers. Many of them, however, show
a pragmatic willingness to deal with other independent political
groups on an equal basis, at least when it suits their purposes.
Which of these various political entities belong to the group
whose practice generates the international rules governing the status
and rights of political entities? It is clear that any selection process,
if it is not purely random or arbitrary, must be governed by criteria
concerning the nature and qualifications of a member. These
criteria cannot be justified by reference to the practice of some
select group among the entire field of polities without falling into
logical circularity. Thus, for example, to argue that the practice of
the Arcadians justifies the rule that only Arcadians are members of
the international community is obviously self-serving. The question
why one should restrict one's inquiry to the Arcadians cannot be
answered by an inquiry restricted to those very entities.
13 1 am not suggesting that this description is purely factual. Even the most "factual"
accounts of the make-up of international society are grounded in certain ways of looking at
things, which are tacitly normative and theoretical. However, this point does not affect my
argument here.
[VOL. 29 No. 4
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Perhaps the solution lies in an empirical inquiry as to which
polities identify themselves as belonging to a group bound by legal
norms, on the theory that the group capable of generating
international rules is self-identifying. This approach, however, is
only capable of discovering a group of political entities that, like an
exclusive club, has its own membership criteria and a distinctive body
of rules that bind exclusively the members. The rules generated by
such a group have no power to bind polities not belonging to the
group. Just because the Arcadians agree among themselves that
territorial rights to the rest of the world can be gained by discovery
does not give a discovering Arcadian state any rights as against a
non-Arcadian entity.
Moreover, several self-identifying groups of political entities
might exist. Suppose that polities M through S make up a rival
group called the Akkamites and that the rules of the Arcadians and
the Akkamites differ on such matters as acquisition of territory. By
what standards could it be decided which set of rules is correct? Or
would one have to rest content with the trite observation that
different groups have different rules? This conclusion, however,
would bring our inquiry to an end, for it concedes that there are no
universal international rules capable of resolving conflicting
territorial claims.
It could be be argued that we should look to the practice of
all factually independent polities in the world in order to determine
the rules governing the international community, including its
membership rules. This is an attractive approach. However, its
attraction lies in a tacit appeal to basic principles of justice. To the
extent that it purports to be based simply on practice, it cannot
escape the error of circularity encountered above. For example,
suppose that the predominant practice among political entities in our
hypothetical world is to recognize all other autonomous political
entities as holding sovereign status. It is not clear why one should
prefer this body of practice over the more exclusive practice of the
Arcadians and hold that it gives rise to norms binding on the
Arcadians which they themselves do not accept.
So, the ultimate criteria for selecting those political entities
whose practice is capable of generating international norms must be
based on something other than international practice. But if the
criteria cannot be justified by practice, they must be grounded in
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normative sources that lie beyond convention, that is, in fundamental
principles of justice. Of course, the above arguments do not
demonstrate the existence of principles of justice capable of solving
the problems we have encountered. To the extent that these
arguments have been successful, they have only shown the need for
such principles. The matter will be pursued in the next section.
One practical point may be drawn here. To rely exclusively
on European state practice to prove that Aboriginal America was
vacant territory is, on its face, a misconceived procedure. It assumes
that European practice standing alone could generate customary
international rules binding on the rest of the world, and in
particular, customary rules permitting European powers to
appropriate large sectors of the occupied world for themselves.14
One might as well try to show that the Barbary states had the right
to prey on Mediterranean shipping by invoking their maritime
practices in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries or cite the
practices of ancient China and its neighbours to prove that the
nations of the world owed tribute to the Middle Kingdom. At best,
an exclusive appeal to European practice is capable of proving the
existence of a customary rule binding European states among
themselves, not one binding other nations and peoples.
IV. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE
It will not be possible here to develop a full set of
fundamental principles governing the original status of Aboriginal
nations and the territories they occupied.1 5 My aim is more modest:
to sketch out a line of argument which shows that the premise that
North America was legally vacant when Europeans arrived cannot be
justified by reference to basic principles of justice. I will attempt to
14 As Chief Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme Court noted in Worcester,
supra, note 11 at 494: "It is difficult to comprehend the proposition that the inhabitants of
either quarter of the globe could have rightful original claims of dominion over the inhabitants
of the other, or over the lands they occupied; or that the discovery of either by the other
should give the discoverer rights in the country discovered which annulled the pre-existing
rights of its ancient possessors."
15 For a thoughtful discussion, see D.G. Gormley, "Aboriginal Rights As Natural Rights"
(1984) 4 Can. 3. Native Stud. at 29.
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do this by blending two different approaches. The first examines the
implications of the premise that North America was terra nuius
when Europeans first arrived and holds that this leads to
unacceptable conclusions. The second argues from basic rights
belonging to all human beings to the conclusion that native
American territories were not legally vacant.
Were it true that native peoples did not hold any exclusive
territorial rights at the era of European contact, North America
would have been in a state of legal anarchy. No native group would
have possessed territorial rights sustainable against any other native
group, so that each group would have had as much right to areas
held by its neighbours as to those under its own control, which is to
say, no right at all.
My argument is that this conclusion contradicts a basic
principle: every human society whose members draw the essentials
of life from territories in their possession (whether collectively or
individually) has a right to these territories as against other societies
and individuals. I will call this the "Principle of Territoriality."
In saying that the Principle entails a right, I mean a
justifiable claim assertible against other groups and individuals. In
attributing this right to a group, I assume that groups and not only
individuals may hold rights, an assumption that could be disputed.
Without attempting a full justification here, we may note that the
concept of group rights is fundamental to the notion of state
sovereignty, itself a cornerstone of modem international law.
Someone who claims that a European state - a collective entity -
had the capacity to acquire rights of sovereignty over American
lands is hardly in a position to deny the existence of group rights.
I am not, of course, suggesting that the Principle of
Territoriality is the only principle of justice relevant to questions of
territorial rights or that its concrete operation may not be modified
in practice by other basic principles and values. I am simply saying
that it is a principle of great weight that applies in the absence of
serious countervailing considerations.
How is the Principle of Territoriality justified? The
argument runs in outline as follows. Were the Principle untrue, a
society would not have the right to protect the territories used by its
members from external depredation and destruction, even though
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these lands are essential to survival.16  But this conclusion
contradicts a more fundamental principle: all human beings have
rights to life and the necessaries of life as against all other people.
This second principle furnishes the ultimate justification for the
Principle of Territoriality. I will now show how in more detail.
We start with the premise, which will not be justified here,
that every human being has the right to life and to the things
necessary to sustain life - what may be called comprehensively the
"right to well-being."17 This right holds good against all other
individuals and groups. It obliges others not only to respect the
individual's well-being, in the negative sense of refraining from
interfering with it, but also in some contexts to take steps to protect
and advance it.
As a matter of experience, we know that an individual's
well-being cannot be secured apart from a social group. The group
need not be a large one and may in fact be fairly small, limited to
an extended family or several families. But some such group must
exist to provide an individual with the basic characteristics and
capacities of a human being. Even a hermit carries society to the
desert, in the basic skills, capacities, ideas, and values that only an
upbringing in human society can engender.
In order to be in a position to protect and advance the
well-being of its members, a social group must be endowed with a
collective moral capacity or status. In particular, it must have the
capacity to act in the interests of its members and the right to
defend them from external attack. This collective status and right
of self-defence are maintainable against all other groups and
individuals. They are justified by reference to the individual's
abstract right to well-being coupled with experience of what is
necessary in practice to secure it. In summary, a society has a right
to protect the well-being of its members against outside groups and
16 Unless the Principle of Territoriality were replaced by another principle serving
essentially the same purposes.
17 For a stimulating defence and elaboration of these rights, see the works of A. Gewirth,
especially, Reason and Moraliy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978) and Human
Rights: Essays on Justificadon and Applications (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
For a critical discussion of Gewirth's arguments from a communitarian perspective, see B.
Slattery, "Rights, Communities, and Tradition" (1991) 41 U.T.L.J. 447.
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individuals. This collective right cannot be denied without denying
the basic rights held by the group's individual members.
But, as noted earlier, in most (perhaps all) societies, the
well-being of their members depends upon individual and collective
uses of territory. Whether a society recognizes private ownership of
land or only collective ownership, whether it acknowledges the
concept of land ownership at all or only rights of use or possession,
the position is the same. Any society has the right to defend
territories in its possession against outside intrusion, insofar as these
territories are necessary to the well-being of the members.
Since native Americans had rights to life and the necessaries
of life, it follows that the societies and groups to which they
belonged had rights to the territories they occupied at the time of
European contact, to the extent that they needed them to survive
and flourish. These rights held good against other groups, including
both Aboriginal and European nations. It cannot be argued that the
right of native American groups to the lands used to sustain their
members was automatically outweighed by the needs and ambitions
of European states and their subjects without impliedly asserting that
the lives of Europeans were more valuable than those of native
Americans.
The rights held by a native group to its territories were
necessarily secure against invasion by others and were, to that
extent, exclusive of other groups. It follows that in principle no
outside group could gain control over or use of the territories in
question without the consent of those already in possession! 8 Even
if the jossessing group was not a fully sovereign entity (perhaps
because it was too small or loosely organized), its territories would
not be terra nullius. Otherwise, an outside state could legitimately
seize the territories and expel the inhabitants or deprive them of
secure access to their lands.
This position is similar to that advanced by Lindley in a
classic work on the subject.19 He argues that an area is not terra
18 Pima facie, this would rule out acquisitions of territory by conquest. However, it may
be argued that, for reasons associated with other basic values and principles of justice,
territories illegitimately acquired may sometimes, by passage of time, be transformed into
legitimate dominions - the process traditionally termed "prescription."
19 Lindley, supra, note 4.
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nullius when it is "inhabited by a political society, that is, by a
considerable number of persons who are permanently united by
habitual obedience to a certain and common superior, or whose
conduct in regard to their mutual relations habitually conforms to
recognized standards."20  Since he recognizes that a community
composed of a number of families qualifies if the members conform
to certain standards in their mutual relationships, his definition
corresponds closely in practice to that advocated here and would
seem to include most and perhaps all native American societies.
Nevertheless, the emphasis in Lindley's approach is a little
misleading. To tie territorial rights too closely to the size of a
group or to the internal conduct of its members is to overlook the
reason for attributing territorial rights to any society in the first
place: namely, to allow it to protect and advance the well-being of
its members, both present and future. Human lives are not more
valuable in a large, highly-structured society than in a small group of
independently-minded hunters and there would seem to be no less
reason to attribute territorial rights to the latter than the former.21
V. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
I have argued that the premise that North America was
legally vacant when Europeans arrived cannot be justified by
reference to positive or natural law. Attempts to justify it on either
basis are afflicted by arbitrariness or circularity, or they conflict with
basic principles of justice. I have also maintained that native
American polities originally had exclusive rights to the territories
they occupied and were entitled to defend them against invasion or
intrusion.
2 0 bd. at 21-23.
21 For other opinions, see, in particular, C. Wolff, Jus Gentwn Methodo Scientifica
Pertractatum, 1764 ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934) Prolegomena, para. 16, c. III, para.
309-13 at 156-60; E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principle of Natural Law, 1758 ed.
(Washington: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1916) vol. I, Book II, c. VII, para. 96-98;
and M. Shaw, 7itle to Teritory inAfrica: International Legal Issus (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1986) at 31-38.
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A number of important consequences flow from these
arguments, which I can only briefly describe here. First, and most
obviously, it cannot be true that the modem states of Canada and
the United States trace their legal origins to "discoveries," symbolic
acts, or acts of occupation carried out by European states. These
modes of acquisition are operative only in legally vacant territories
and so could not apply to most of North America at the time of
European contact. Accounts based on contrary assumptions are
misguided.
Canada and the United States came into being, not simply
through the activities of incoming European powers, but through a
complex series of interactions among various settler groups and
Aboriginal nations.22 What forms those relations took - whether
alliance, treaty, informal agreement, longstanding practice, or war -
is a matter for detailed inquiry. But I suggest that the inquiry will
reveal that Canada and the United States have more complicated
constitutional structures than is sometimes assumed; structures based
in part on inter-societal custom generated in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. Under these structures, Aboriginal nations
continue to hold a residue of the sovereignty they once possessed.
This conclusion has been broadly accepted in the United States,
although its significance has been underestimated.23 In Canada, the
concept of internal sovereignty should come as no great novelty, for
it has long been held that the provinces are autonomous within their
constitutional spheres.
A second consequence affects our understanding of the
genesis of international law. The fact that native American nations
22 Compare the conclusion of the International Court of Justice regarding the status of
Western Sahara at the period of its colonization by Spain beginning in 1884:
[Tihe State practice of the relevant period indicates that territories inhabited by
tribes or peoples having a social and political organization were not regarded as
terrae nullius. It shows that in the case of such territories the acquisition of
sovereignty was not generally considered as effected unilaterally through "occupation"
of terrae nullius by original title but through agreements concluded with local rulers
... In the present instance, the information furnished to the Court shows that at the
time of colonization Western Sahara was inhabited by peoples which, if nomadic,
were socially and politically organized in tribes and under chiefs competent to
represent them.
Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, [1975] I.C.J. Rep. 12 at 39.
23 See, especially, Worcester, supra, note 11.
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had international status and title to their territories suggests that
they were capable of contributing to the formation of international
custom, ordinarily considered a principal source of international law.
The extensive records of treaties and other relations between
Aboriginal nations and European governments, particularly in the
period 1600-1800, indicates that these nations did in fact make such
contributions and that they did so at a crucial stage in the
development of international law. So modern international law is
not the exclusive product of European genius, as some texts fondly
suggest. It stems from the activities and conceptions of a wide
range of European and non-European nations, including the
Aboriginal peoples of America.24 Once again, this is a promising
ground for historical investigation.
The third consequence is closely related to the previous two.
The extensive relations between Aboriginal nations and the English
colonies on the Atlantic seaboard in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries gave rise to a distinctive body of inter-societal custom,
recognized as binding among the parties. This custom was neither
entirely English nor entirely Aboriginal in character, but
incorporated elements from the legal cultures of all participants.
Some of this custom contributed to the development of international
law. But other parts were too local and specific for universal
application. Important elements of this body of custom were
incorporated in the embryonic constitutional law governing Britain's
overseas territories, sometimes called "colonial law" or "imperial
constitutional law."25 This law was inherited by the United States
and Canada upon independence, although it assumed variant forms
in the two countries due to differences in constitutional structure.
It now forms part of their basic common law.26  Since imperial
24 For work that dispenses with a European centred methodology, see the pioneering
legal-historical research of C.H. Alexandrowicz, notably, An Introduction to the Histoty of the
Law of Nations in the East Indies (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967) and The European-African
Confrontation. A Study in Treaty Making (Leiden, Netherlands: Sijthoff, 1973).
25 The argument is elaborated in B. Slattery, 'Understanding Aboriginal Rights" (1987)
66 Can. Bar Rev. 727.
26 The point was apparently accepted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Roberts v.
Canada, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 322 at 340; see the discussion in J.M. Evans & B. Slattery, "Case
Note: Federal Jurisdiction - Pendent Parties - Aboriginal Title and Federal Common Law"
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constitutional law applied, not only in North America, but also in
other British possessions, the same basic principles were arguably
incorporated in the basic law of such Commonwealth nations as New
Zealand and Australia. In effect, the body of inter-societal law that
developed on the Atlantic seaboard in the period 1600-1800 is the
core of the law of Aboriginal rights, which in Canada has received
explicit constitutional recognition.27
Above all, these reflections encourage us to find new ways
of understanding our common and several histories, as native
Americans and newcomers. For embedded in the past are the seeds
of our future hopes.
(1989) 68 Can. Bar Rev. 817 at 831-32. See also Montana Band v. Canada (1 February
1991), T-617-85 (F.C.T.D.).
27 Most recently in section 35(1) of the Constitution Act 1982, being Schedule B of the
Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, which recognizes and affirms the "existing aboriginal and
treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada." Recognition has also been extended in a
series of earlier constitutional instruments, notably the Royal Proclamation of 1763, R.S.C.
1985, App. II, No.1. Section 35(1) of the Constitution Ac 1982 has recently been given a
broad interpretation by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075.
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